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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent seeks an affirmation of the 
award modification by the Industrial Commission and a finding 
upholding the constitutionality of the statute under which 
such award was made. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-Respondent agrees with and accepts 
plaintiff-appellant's factual statement. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 35-1-73, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, 195 3, AS AMENDED AND IN EFFECT 
DURING THE PERIOD HERE IN QUESTION, REPRESENT 
AN UNDER-INCLUSIVE CLASSIFICATION OF DEPENDENTS 
ESTABLISHED BY THE LEGISLATURE AND BASED UPON 
REASONABLE GROUNDS AND EXPECTATIONS. AS SUCH, 
THIS CLASSIFICATION IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL, 
ARBITRARY OR UNREASONABLE. 
The purpose and objectives of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act are well stated in the brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, 
[The Workmen's Compensation Act] . • • is a 
beneficent law, passed to protect employees 
and those dependent upon them; to damnify 
certain persons because workmen cease to earn 
wages, and to provide workmen's dependents 
with something in substitution for what they 
lost by the workmen's death. The clear intention 
of the Legislature was "to substitute a more 
humanitarian and economical system of compen-
sation for the injured workmen or their depen-
dents in case of their death," which the more 
humane and moral conception of our time requires. 
The Act affords, through administrative bodies, 
injured industrial workmen or their dependents 
simple, adequate and speedy means of securing 
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compensation, to the end that the "cost of 
human wreckage may be taxed against the 
industry which employs it," which tax or 
burden is added to the price of the produce 
and is ultimately paid by the consumer. 
Thus the Legislature sought to promote the 
public welfare by releiving society of the 
support of unfortunate victims of industrial 
accidents, and to avoid the necessity of 
the employee's dependents becoming objects 
of public charity. Park Utah Consolidated 
Mines Co. v« Industrial Commission^ 84 Utah 
481, at 485 to 486, 36 P.2d 979, at 981, 
(193 4) 
Several parts of the foregoing quotation should be 
emphasized. First, the act is a beneficent one. If it were 
completely and totally beneficent, one would, upon being adjudged 
a dependent of an injured or deceased workman, receive complete 
compensation forever. No limitation as to amount, duration of 
payments or percentage of the workman's income would exist. 
Obviously this act is not completely beneficent. The Legislature 
recognized such charity cannot exist due to expense, which raises 
the second point of emphasis. Compensation to dependents is, 
according to the quotation, to be adequate, as opposed to being 
complete or total. 
The third point of emphasis is legislative recognition 
of the fact that the expense incurred to support this beneficent 
law would ultimately fall on the consumer. This was felt to be 
a better remedy, keeping in mind the public welfare, than to 
allow dependents to become "objects of public charity." The expense 
mentioned above was limited, however, by the legislature. Some 
of those limitations have been mentioned already i.e. amount of 
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compensation is based on a percentage of the workman's salary 
as opposed to being equal to the workman's salary and time 
limitations. The result being that "consumers" are not required 
to support dependents completely or forever. They are only required 
to "adequately" support dependents. 
In Section 35-1-73, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended and in effect, we are dealing with another limitation 
upon the expense of supporting dependents: 
. . . should a widow, who.is the sole 
dependent . . . and who is receiving the 
benefits of this title, remarry during the 
period covered by such weekly payments, her 
sole right after such remarriage, to further 
payments of compensation shall be the right 
to receive in a lump sum 1/3 of the benefits 
remaining unpaid at the time of such remarriage. 
It is obvious that the Legislature elected to limit the 
"expense" burden on the "consumer" by saying that once a sole-
widow-dependent remarries, most, but not all, of the burden to 
support that dependent goes to the new spouse. 
It should be kept in mind that the purpose of this 
section of the Act is conceptually at odds with the "beneficent" 
character mentioned above. It is in keeping with the concept of 
"adequate" benefits to dependents, however. Any discussion of 
the purpose of this particular section should be in the context 
of its specific purpose rather than the overall beneficent purpose 
of the Act. 
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Keeping in mind the burden on the consumer, the remaining 
part of the statute goes on: 
After deduction of the 1/3 payable upon 
remarriage, there being no dependents, one-
half of the sum of the benefits remaining 
shall be paid by the employer into the 
special injury fund as defined in Section 
35-1-68, 
This entire section is completely compatible with the 
statement of the purpose of the act cited above and in plaintiff-
appellant's brief. 
Larson ' s , Workmen's Compensation Law §64.40, Revision 
or Termination of Benef i t s , s t a t e s : 
Once r i g h t s as a dependent under an award 
have been acquired, they are not l o s t by a 
subsequent change in the dependent 's f i nanc i a l 
p o s i t i o n , nor by any change shor t of the events , 
such as remarriage or at tainment of a spec i f ied 
age, expressly terminating compensation by 
s t a t u t e . (Emphasis added) 
I t i s apparent from th i s quotat ion tha t such l imi t a t ions 
are p r a c t i c a l l y un ive r sa l in workmen's compensation laws. The 
quota t ion mentions the spec i f i c l im i t a t i on discussed in p l a i n t i f f -
a p p e l l a n t ' s b r i e f . That b r i e f goes on to point out t h a t because 
"sole-widow" dependents are not t r ea t ed the same as "minor chi ld" 
dependents, in t h a t "a subsequent change in the dependent 's 
f i nanc i a l pos i t ion" i s not measured with the same r u l e r , then 
equal p ro tec t ion i s denied and the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n so es tab l i shed 
i s a r b i t r a r y . This idea as expressed by p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t 
assumes t h a t the Workmen's Compensation Act equates "sole widow" 
dependents and "minor chi ld" dependents when in f ac t the Act 
does not do t h i s , and does not purport to do t h i s . The Act 
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creates two classif icat ions which are separate and d i s t inc t . 
To compare two classif icat ions to each other, then to arrive at 
the conclusion that equal protection under the law is violated 
when members of one c lass i f icat ion are not treated the same as 
those of another c lass i f icat ion is a worthless exercise producing 
i r re levant r e su l t s , yet this i s what i s done in pla int i f f -appel lant 1 
brief . 
It is, of course, understood that one cannot avoid equal 
protection challenges to a classification simply by stating that 
it exists, in contrast to another classification. It should be 
important to note that "reasonableness" enters into any analysis 
of a legislative classification. In order to understand the 
bounds which the Legislature intended to create when writing 
this particular section of the Act, it is important to read 
Sizemore v. Industrial Commission, 4 U.2d 126, 288 P.2d 788, 
(1955). The case itself differs factually from that presented 
here, but an important statement is made as to the purpose of 
this specific code section, (at 789): 
This statute clothes the Commission with 
broad powers to distribute the award in 
such manner as it deems will best serve the 
interests, needs and welfare of the parties,. 
These matters must, of course, be considered 
in the light of, and bear proper relationship 
to, the legal or moral obligations deceased 
had to the dependents in question. 
Two tools given the Industrial Commission as part of 
the "broad powers" mentioned are, inter alia, the powers to reduce 
benefits to a sole-widow dependent upon her remarriage and to 
end benefits should any dependent die. 
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Equal p ro tec t ion cases, have always recognized t h a t 
governments cannot function without c lass i fy ing i t s c i t i z ens 
and cons t i tuen t s for a va r i e ty of reasons and, when t h i s c l a s s i -
f i ca t i on i s complete, t r e a t i n g some groups d i f f e r en t ly from 
o t h e r s . These c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s may be challenged as denying 
equal p ro t ec t i on , but v a l i d i t y i s usual ly e s t ab l i shed i f the 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n includes " a l l [and only those] persons who are 
s im i l a r l y s i t u a t e d with respec t to the purpose of the law". 
Tussman & tenBrock, The Equal Pro tec t ion of the Laws, 3 7 Cal i f . 
L. Rev. 341, 346 (1949). 
As discussed above, the purpose of t h i s law, s p e c i f i c a l l y 
Section 35-1-73, U.C.A., 1953, as amended and in e f fec t i s , 
obviously, to provide some reasonable and acceptable l imi t a t ions 
upon what might become an overly heavy f i nanc i a l "burden." The 
next s tep in a proper analysis of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h i s 
sec t ion i s to determine the reasonableness of the L e g i s l a t u r e ' s 
method of l i m i t a t i o n . At the time of the occurrences here 
considered, the Leg is la tu re apparently f e l t t h a t sole-widow 
dependents would not be overly penalized i f t h e i r awards were 
reduced upon remarr iage. This conclusion was undoubtedly based 
upon the f ac t t h a t a new spouse could and would s u b s t i t u t e 
support for the bene f i t s o r i g i n a l l y awarded. In the case of 
minor-child dependents however, marriage, genera l ly , would not 
represent an opportunity to s u b s t i t u t e one form of support for 
another . In many cases , mairriage for a minor-chi ld dependent 
represents a g r ea t e r f inanc ia l burden to them. Since those 
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minor chi ldren might have looked to the deceased workman for 
some type of he lp , why not continue t h e i r award, in a l a rge r 
amount.than t h a t of a widow-dependent. 
Since the l im i t a t i on placed on sole-widows might have 
been placed upon minor ch i ld ren , i t i s evident t h a t t h i s spec i f i c 
provis ion i s under- inc lus ive in na tu re . Under-inclusion occurs 
when a s t a t e benef i t s or burdens persons in a manner t ha t fur thers 
a l eg i t imate publ ic purpose, but does not confer the same benef i t s 
or burdens on others who may have s imi la r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s or be 
in a s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n . The U.S. Supreme Court has held t ha t 
under- inc lus ion does not deny equal p ro tec t ion under the law. 
This pos i t i on i s founded on the holding tha t the Leg i s l a tu re 
i s free to resolve problems, cor rec t mischief or to recognize 
degrees of e v i l and to do so by r e c t i f i c a t i o n where the problems 
are most concentra ted. This may be done even i f other areas 
causing the same problem are ignored. Williamson v. Lee Opt ica l , 
Inc . 348 U.S. 483, 488, (1955); 82 Harvard Law Review 1065, 1084. 
In Williamson v. Lee Opt ica l , I n c . , sup ra . , the Court 
sa id : 
The problem of legislative classification 
is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire 
definition. Evils in the same field may be of 
different dimensions and proportions, requiring 
different remedies. Or so the Legislature may 
think. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141. Or the 
reform may take one step at a time, addressing 
itself to the phase of the problem which seems 
most acute to the Legislative mind. Semler v. 
Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608. The Legislature 
may select one phase of one field and apply a 
remedy there neglecting the others. A.F. of L. v. 
American Sash, 335 U.S. 538. 
In many situations, toleration of under-inclusion may 
simply be a recognition of the fact that persons similarly 
situated with respect to one set of circumstances, may be 
differently situated with respect to another set of circumstances. 
This is certainly the situation with the case at bar. Sole 
widows and minor children may both be similar in dependency on 
a deceased workman. When it comes to modifying or limiting the 
expense burden their dependency creates, however, they are 
different* The Workmen's Compensation Act recognizes this 
difference by saying that a sole-widowfs benefits should be 
reduced to decrease the financial "burden" upon "consumers", 
discussed above. To do the same for minor-child dependents, 
however, might, due to the financial burden which marriage 
represents to them, increase the burden on "society." In weighing 
the burden on consumers as opposed to society, in the case of 
minor children, the Legislature has left the burden with the 
consumer. To quote again from Williamson, supra., at 487: 
. . . the law need not be in every respect 
logically consistent with its aims to be 
constitutional. It is enough that there 
is an evil at hand for correction, and 
that it might be thought that a particular 
Legislative measure was a rational way to 
correct it. 
CONCLUSION 
It should be remembered that the general rule holds 
a legislative act constitutional unless its invalidity appears 
beyond a reasonable coubt. This applies to workmen's compensation 
acts generally. Any allegation to the contrary places the burden 
on him who asserts it. Further, any construction which reasonably 
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favors constitutionality should be accepted over one which does 
not. Schneider, Workmenfs Compensationf Perm, Ed., Vol. 1, 
Section 11. 
The legislative pronouncement in Section 35-1-73, Utah 
Code Annotated represents a valid treatment of the legislative 
problem of giving adequate benefits to dependents without creating 
an unbearable financial burden. It is reasonable and based upon 
legitimate expectations. As such, the constitutionality of this 
section should be established and the modification of award by 
the Industrial Commission should be affirmed. 
DATED this Z& day of May, 19 76. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT D. M O O R E S 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
400 Ten Broadway Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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